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TAGS: PFOR, PARM, MARR, UR, US

SUBJ: SOVIET JOURNAL ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

1. SUMMARY: ARTICLE BY A. KARENIN IN MOST RECENT
MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS) EXPLAINS

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AND PRAISES ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS REACHED IN 1974 SUMMIT

AND EXPRESSES OPINIONS ON THE SHAPE OF FUTURE ARMS AGREEMENTS. IT ASCRIBES "FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE" TO THE NEGOTIATING METHOD EMPLOYED DURING SALT-I, AND EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FBS AND FORWARD BASE ISSUE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' CARRIES ARTICLE BY A. KARENIN ENTITLED "ON RESTRAINT OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS." ARTICLE OSTENSIBLY WAS WRITTEN TO PRAISE, AND TO EXPLAIN, ARMS AGREEMENT REACHED AT 1974 SUMMIT; AT SAME TIME, ARTICLE GOES INTO DETAIL ON NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF SALT I AND EXPRESSES OPINIONS ON POSSIBLE SHAPE OF FUTURE ARMS AGREEMENTS. EXCERPTS ARE PARAPHRASED BELOW.

3. ON THE NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT ON LIMITING FBS: KARENIN NOTES THAT EQUAL SECURITY HAS BEEN A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN PREVIOUS ARMS AGREEMENTS, AND IS IN FACT AN IMPORTANT PART OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. BUT SUCH EQUAL SECURITY CANNOT BE BASED, IN THE CASE OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES, ON THE SIMPLIFIED APPROACH MET IN THE AMERICAN PRESS. EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER (PO CHISLU EDINITS) OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DOES NOT MEAN EQUAL SECURITY, ESPECIALLY IF ONLY TRIAD WEAPONS ARE INCLUDED. "EQUAL SECURITY CAN BE PROVIDED ONLY BY A COMPREHENSIVE AND IMPARTIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE TOTALITY OF FACTORS WHICH MAKE UP THE PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION, WITH ACCOUNT TAKEN FOR CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE FUTURE." THE QUESTION OF WHICH OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO CATEGORIZE AS STRATEGIC HAS FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE. FOR THE NEEDS OF NEGOTIATION THEY SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED MERELY TO THE TRIAD, BUT RATHER SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED ON THE BASIS OF THE MOST RELEVANT FACTOR -- ABILITY TO REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER STATE. FBS AND, HE ADDS, FORWARD BASES, SHOULD THEREFORE "NOT BE LOST FROM VIEW." COMPLETING HIS CONFUSION OF FBS AND FORWARD BASES, KARENIN QUOTES NEWSWEEK ESTIMATE THAT DIEGO GARCIA WILL DOUBLE THE LENGTH OF TIME SUBS (SHICH OF COURSE ARE NOT FBS) CAN REMAIN IN THAT AREA, THUS RESULTING IN INCREASE IN NUMBER

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OF SUBS ON PATROL.

4. ON NEGOTIATING METHOD: JUST AS FBS MUST BE KEPT IN MIND, NEITHER IS IT POSSIBLE TO LOSE FROM VIEW "DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION OF THE SIDES AND SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION." SOME OF THE QUESTIONS HAVING TO DO WITH "OBJECTIVE ASYMMETRIES " (OB'JEKTIVNO SUSHCHESTVUYUSHCHIE

DISPROPORTSII) WERE SOLVED IN SALT I. SALT I BOTH BY SUBJECT OF AGREEMENT AND "BY THE METHOD WHICH PROBLEMS WERE SOLVED" HAS "FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE." SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE DESCRIBE HOW SALT I LIMITED ABM DEPLOYMENT TO AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SITES AND MISSILES FOR EACH SIDE; HOW FURTHER CONSTRUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IS FROZEN FOR FIVE YEARS; AND HOW EACH SIDE AGREED NOT TO MODIFY LAUNCH SITES FOR ICBM'S. ARTICLE CONTINUES THAT SALT I "PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE" IN CHECKING AN INCREASE IN DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, POINTING OUT THAT IT CAUSED CANCELLATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF SAFEGUARD. U.S. AUTHOR DAVID LANDAU IS QUOTED TO EFFECT THAT "IMPORTANT SUCCESS" WAS PROHIBITION OF DEVELOPMENT BY BOTH SIDES OF ABM SYSTEMS. COMMENT: ARTICLE'S APPROVAL OF SALT I NEGOTIATING MEHTODS APPEARS, FROM PARAS OUTLINED ABOVE, TO BE AIMED AT FLEXIBLE USE OF LIMITS ON DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCTION, DEPLOYMENT, OR MODIFICATION OF SYSTEMS ALREADY DEPLOYED, AS THE CASE MAY REQUIRE, TO ENSURE AN APPROACH IS FOUND TO COVER "OBJECTIVE ASYMMETRIES." ARTICLE ALSO QUOTES, WITH IMPLICATION OF APPROVAL, U.S. AUTHOR JAMES COFFEY'S STATEMENT IN 1971 THAT U.S.-USSR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS COULD INCLUDE LIMITATION ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, ABM LIMITATIONS, AND PROHIBITION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS. END COMMENT.

5. ON THE NEED FOR AN ABM AGREEMENT IN SALT I: THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT THE UNINITIATED MAY NOT UNDERSTAND THE REASON FOR AN AGREEMENT LIMITING DEFENSIVE WEAPONS AS A METHOD OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. HE EXPLAINS THAT: (1) DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SIMPLY CAUSES INCREASED EXPENDITURE ON RESEARCH TO DESIGN OFFENSIVE
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WEAPONS TO PENETRATE THESE NEW SYSTEMS; AND (2) DEPLOYMENT OF A FAR-FLUNG NETWORK OF ABM'S COULD GIVE BIRTH TO THE ILLUSION AMONG "A CERTAIN SECTOR OF REACTIONARY MILITARY CIRCLES IN THE USA" THAT THEIR "ADVENTURIST ACTIONS" COULD GO UNPUNISHED IN CASE OF A CONFLICT SITUATION.

6. 1974 SUMMIT AGREEMENTS: IN EXPLAINING THESE ARMS AGREEMENTS KARENIN CALLS THE ABM PROTOCOL "A SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER LIMITATION." ARTICLE NOTES THAT AN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AGREEMENT IS TO REPLACE THE PRESENT PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT, BUT DOES NOT GO INTO ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES OF LONGER TERM CALLED FOR AT THE SUMMIT. KARENIN ADMITS THAT REACHING THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE DIFFICULT, BUT VOICES

OPTIMISM ON THE BASIS OF ACCUMULATED NEGOTIATING
EXPERIENCE OF THE TWO SIDES AND ON THE BASIS OF THE
WORK DONE AT THE MOST RECENT SUMMIT. ARTICLE CONCLUDES
WITH A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF OTHER ARMS AGREEMENTS AND
PROTOCOLS REACHED AT THE SUMMIT AND WITH COMMENT THAT
THESE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED IN INTERNATIONAL
CIRCLES.

7. EMBASSY HAS NO BIO INFORMATION ON KARENIN,
WHO IS NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED IN JOURNAL.
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